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OPINION 
______________
 
MATEY, Circuit Judge. 
It is a familiar story in the life of a publicly held 
business. A corporation identifies an opportunity and decides 
to ask its shareholders for their approval to pursue. But the 
business runs in a highly regulated space like finance. So the 
company proceeds through a thick web of laws and regulations 
that detail how to explain both the risks and the rewards of the 
opportunity to the shareholders. With a bit of good fortune, all 
the hard work pays off when the shareholders give their 
blessing. And then, after the deal is done, only the class action 
hurdle remains. That is because for more than five decades, 
these transactions have been subject to a three-tier system of 
enforcement: oversight by Congress, supervision by regulators 
like the Securities and Exchange Commission, and “private 
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attorneys general”1 pursuing “a private right of action.” Gen. 
Elec. Co. v. Cathcart, 980 F.2d 927, 932 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing 
J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430–31 (1964)). 
 
We consider that final frontier of enforcement in this 
appeal. Hudson City Bank (“Hudson”) and M&T Bank 
Corporation (“M&T”) successfully merged in 2015. But their 
union triggered a protest by a few Hudson shareholders, who 
filed a putative class action (together, the “Shareholders”). The 
complaint alleged the banks didn’t disclose material 
information about M&T’s practice of adding fees to no-fee 
“free” checking accounts or its failure to comply with federal 
anti-money laundering regulations. And despite a healthy 
return on their investment, the Shareholders argue these 
omissions or misstatements caused all Hudson shareholders 
financial harm. In a comprehensive opinion, the District Court 
dismissed these claims. We now vacate and remand for further 
proceedings based on prior decisions allowing suits alleging 
inadequate transparency or deception. We reiterate the 
longstanding limitations on securities fraud actions that 
insulate issuers from second-guesses, hindsight clarity, and a 
regime of total disclosure. 
  
 
1 Most ascribe the colorful phrase to Judge Jerome 
Frank. Associated Indus. N.Y. State, Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 
704 (2d Cir. 1943), vacated, 320 U.S. 707 (1943). 
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I.  BACKGROUND 
A. The Proposal 
Chartered in 1868, Hudson grew to become one of the 
largest savings banks in New Jersey. Avoiding modern 
products and trends in favor of steady deposits and safe 
mortgages, Hudson enjoyed a strong reputation of stability. 
But, following the 2008 recession, Hudson struggled to hold 
its footing. It launched reforms, shedding debt, eying 
diversification, and considering opportunities to merge. 
Eventually, Hudson found a partner in M&T and the two banks 
struck a deal. Investors appeared to welcome the 
announcement with M&T’s stock price rising on the news. 
 
B. The Joint Proxy 
The merger agreement promised Hudson shareholders a 
mixture of cash and M&T stock, and required approval by the 
shareholders of both banks. To provide the required notice, 
Hudson and M&T opted to issue a Joint Prospectus (“Joint 
Proxy”) and filed a single Form S-4 in accordance with SEC 
rules.2 That form requires issuers to provide, among other 
things, “the information required by Item 503 of Regulation S-
 
2 Firms may use Form S-4 to register securities issued 
in a merger. (Docket Entry Dated July 13, 2018: Letter from 
David R. Fredrickson, Chief Counsel/Associated Director, 
Division of Corporate Finance, United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission (July 12, 2018).) The form also allows 
for the filing of a joint prospectus/proxy statement, as M&T 
and Hudson elected to do here. 
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K.” Item 503, since recodified as Item 105,3 asks for “the most 
significant factors that make an investment in the registrant or 
offering speculative or risky.” 17 C.F.R. § 229.105. Each “risk 
factor” requires an individual topic heading supported by 
information that is both “concise and organized logically.” Id. 
Specificity is key, as the regulation cautions filers to omit 
“risks that could apply generically to any registrant or any 
offering.” Id. And Item 105 is where the Shareholders direct 
their attack, alleging this portion of the Joint Proxy was 
misleading and incomplete. We turn to those disclosures. 
 
1. The “Risks Related to M&T” 
As required, the Joint Proxy included a section titled 
“Risks Related to M&T” (App. at 0237), with subsections on 
“Risks Relating to Economic and Market Conditions,” “Risks 
Relating to M&T’s Business,” and “Risks Relating to the 
Regulatory Environment.” (App. at A0237–48.) Discussing 
the regulatory environment, the Joint Proxy noted that “M&T 
is subject to extensive government regulation and supervision” 
because of “the Dodd-Frank Act and related regulations.” 
(App. at A1010 (emphasis omitted).) It cautioned that “M&T 
expects to face increased regulation of its industry as a result 
of current and possible future initiatives.” (App. at A1010.) 
That will lead to “more intense scrutiny in the examination 
process and more aggressive enforcement of regulations on 
both the federal and state levels,” which would “likely increase 
M&T’s costs[,] reduce its revenue[,] and may limit its ability 
to pursue certain desirable business opportunities.” (App. at 
 
3 See FAST Act Modernization and Simplification of 
Regulation S-K, 84 FR 12674, 12716–17 (April 2, 2019). We 
will refer to the current regulation. 
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A1010.) The Joint Proxy also stated that “from time to time, 
M&T is, or may become, the subject of governmental and self-
regulatory agency information-gathering requests, reviews, 
investigations and proceedings and other forms of regulatory 
inquiry, including by the SEC and law enforcement 
authorities.” (App. at A0248.) That ongoing oversight, in turn, 
might lead to “significant monetary damages or penalties, 
adverse judgments, settlements, fines, injunctions, restrictions 
on the way in which M&T conducts its business, or 
reputational harm.” (App. at A0248.) And the Joint Proxy 
noted operational risks “encompass[ing] reputational risk and 
compliance and legal risk, which is the risk of loss from 
violations of, or noncompliance with, laws, rules, regulations, 
prescribed practices or ethical standards, as well as the risk of 
noncompliance with contractual and other obligations.” (App. 
at A0245.) That dense fog of possible problems, as we will see, 
looms large. 
 
2. Other Warnings 
A few additional statements related to risk appeared 
elsewhere in the Joint Proxy. A section titled, “Regulatory 
Approvals Required for the Merger” advised that 
“[c]ompletion of the merger . . . [is] subject to the receipt of all 
approvals required to complete the transactions contemplated 
by the merger agreement . . . from the Federal Reserve Board.” 
(App. at A1017.) And the Federal Reserve Board, “[a]s part of 
its evaluation . . . , reviews: . . . the effectiveness of the 
companies in combatting money laundering.” (App. at A1018.) 
While M&T “believe[d]” timely regulatory approval was 
realistic, it was unsure. (App. at A1017; see also App. at 
A1009.) Rather, M&T offered that: 
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Although we currently believe we should be able 
to obtain all required regulatory approvals in a 
timely manner, we cannot be certain when or if 
we will obtain them or, if obtained, whether they 
will contain terms, conditions or restrictions not 
currently contemplated that will be detrimental 
to M&T after the completion of the merger or 
will contain a burdensome condition. 
 
(App. at A1017.) 
 
3. The Annual Report 
 
At M&T’s election, the Joint Proxy incorporated 
M&T’s 2011 Annual Report on Form 10-K as permitted by 
Form S-4. There, M&T warned that the Patriot Act requires 
that “U.S. financial institutions . . . implement and maintain 
appropriate policies, procedures and controls which are 
reasonably designed to prevent, detect and report instances of 
money laundering.” (App. at A1028.) But investors could take 
comfort, the Joint Proxy explained, because M&T’s “approved 
policies and procedures [are] believed to comply with the USA 
Patriot Act.” (App. at A1028.)  
 
C.  New Disclosures, Governmental Intervention, and 
 Regulatory Delay 
 
M&T filed the Joint Proxy with the SEC, which was 
declared effective on February 22, 2013, mailed it to all 
shareholders five days later, and scheduled a vote on the 
proposal for April. Then, a few days before the ballots, M&T 
and Hudson announced that “additional time will be required 
to obtain a regulatory determination on the applications 
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necessary to complete their proposed merger.” (App. at 
A1041.) In a supplemental proxy, M&T revealed that the 
Federal Reserve Board identified “certain regulatory concerns” 
about “procedures, systems and processes relating to M&T’s 
Bank Secrecy Act and anti-money-laundering compliance 
program.”4 (App. at A1041.) M&T explained that to address 
these concerns, “the timeframe for closing the transaction will 
be extended substantially beyond the date previously 
expected.” (App. at A1041.) As a result, M&T and Hudson 
amended their merger agreement and moved the closure back 
 
4 As the Joint Proxy notes, the merger required approval 
by the Federal Reserve Board, among other regulators. As part 
of its review, the Federal Reserve Board assesses the banks’ 
effectiveness in combatting money laundering, requiring a 
risk-management program incorporating the Bank Secrecy Act 
and anti-money-laundering (“BSA/AML”) compliance. See 
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate 
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (“USA 
PATRIOT”) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 
(codified at various sections of the U.S. Code). Title III of the 
Act, captioned “International Money Laundering Abatement 
and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001,” amended the Bank 
Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5311 et seq., and “imposed more 
stringent requirements aimed at money laundering.” Mendez 
Internet Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Banco Santander de P.R., 621 
F.3d 10, 13 (1st Cir. 2010). To ensure compliance, banks must 
collect, process, and update information necessary to make 
money-laundering risk determinations for every customer and 
account. Banks are also required to have in place acceptable 
processes and policies to detect and report related suspicious 
activity. 
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several months.5 The shareholder vote, however, remained as 
scheduled. And these revelations did not deter the 
shareholders, who overwhelmingly approved the merger. But 
it took nearly two and a half more years before regulators 
allowed the deal to close. 
 
While the banks awaited the conclusion of the Federal 
Reserve review, M&T received more bad news. The Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) announced an 
enforcement action against M&T for offering customers free 
checking before switching them to fee-based accounts without 
notice. A practice, the CFPB noted, that was in place when the 
merger was first proposed, and that had impacted nearly 60,000 
customers. M&T agreed to pay $2.045 million to settle the 
allegations, the approximate amount of the customer injuries. 
 
D. The Shareholder Suit 
 
A few weeks before the merger closed, David 
Jaroslawicz, a Hudson shareholder, filed a putative class action 
against M&T, Hudson, and their directors and officers 
(together, “M&T”). He claimed that the Joint Proxy omitted 
material risks associated with the merger in violation of the 
Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)(1) and 17 C.F.R. 
 
5 M&T provided more context a few days later during 
an earnings conference call, explaining that the compliance 
issues were significant enough to “impact [the] ability to close 
the merger . . . in the near term.” (App. at A1048.) And M&T 
noted it needed “to implement [a] plan for improvement . . . to 
the satisfaction of . . . the regulators prior to obtaining 
regulatory approvals for the merger.” (App. at A1048.) 
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§ 240.14a-9(a). He also brought a claim for breach of fiduciary 
duty under Delaware law.6 
 
After the Shareholders filed an amended complaint, 
M&T moved to dismiss for failure to plead an actionable claim. 
The District Court granted that motion, but allowed the 
Shareholders to amend. After the Shareholders amended, M&T 
again moved to dismiss. The District Court granted M&T’s 
motion. See Jaroslawicz v. M&T Bank Corp., 296 F. Supp. 3d 
670 (D. Del. 2017). 
 
In their Second Amended Complaint, the Shareholders 
presented two theories of M&T’s liability for the Joint Proxy’s 
deficiencies. First, because the Joint Proxy did not discuss 
M&T’s non-compliant BSA/AML practices and deficient 
consumer checking program, the Shareholders contend that 
M&T failed to disclose material risk factors facing the merger, 
as required by Item 105. Second, they assert that M&T’s 
failure to discuss these allegedly non-compliant practices 
rendered M&T’s opinion statements about its adherence to 
regulatory requirements and the prospects for prompt approval 
of the merger, misleading. 
 
The District Court held that the Joint Proxy sufficiently 
disclosed the regulatory risks associated with the merger. The 
Court also held that M&T did not have to disclose the 
consumer checking violations exposed after the merger 
announcement. And, applying Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers 
District Council Construction Industry Pension Fund, 575 
 
6 The District Court later appointed the Belina family to 
serve as lead plaintiffs for the class action. 
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U.S. 175 (2015), the Court found no misleading opinions. The 
Court again allowed the Shareholders to amend the pleadings, 
but the Shareholders asked for a final order of dismissal with 
prejudice to file this appeal.7  
 
II.  JURISDICTION AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78aa, and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337. We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. As the Shareholders bring their appeal 
from the District Court’s final order granting a motion to 
dismiss with prejudice, we exercise plenary review. See In re 
NAHC, Inc. Sec. Litig., 306 F.3d 1314, 1322–23 (3d Cir. 2002). 
But we are to accept the facts in the light most favorable to the 
non-moving party. Jones v. ABN Amro Mortg. Grp., Inc., 606 
F.3d 119, 123 (3d Cir. 2010). Dismissal is proper only where 
the complaint fails to state a claim “that is plausible on its 
face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). A claim is plausible “when the 
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the courts to draw 
 
7 Following a panel decision of this Court, M&T 
petitioned for en banc review or a panel rehearing, and we 
granted the latter request. See Jaroslawicz v. M&T Bank Corp., 
925 F.3d 605 (3d Cir. 2019). In its petition for rehearing, M&T 
waived the argument that the Shareholders’ Second Amended 
Complaint failed to plausibly allege loss causation. (Appellees’ 
Reh’g Pet. at 6.) 
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the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 
misconduct alleged.”8 Id. 
 
III.  THE SHAREHOLDERS’ TWIN THEORIES OF LIABILITY:  
ACTIONABLE OMISSIONS AND MISLEADING OPINIONS 
 
A. The Shareholders Plausibly Allege an Actionable 
 Omission or  Misrepresentation 
 
 1. Actionable Omissions and Misrepresentations  
  Defined 
 
 We start by setting some boundaries. The Shareholders 
have pleaded claims under Section 14(a) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, as codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a), and 
the regulations promulgated by the Commission. But that 
statute does not provide for a private right of action. And since 
“Congress creates federal causes of action,” where “the text of 
a statute does not provide a cause of action, there ordinarily is 
no cause of action.” Johnson v. Interstate Mgmt. Co., 849 F.3d 
1093, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 2017); see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan 
A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 313 
(2012) (“A statute’s mere prohibition of a certain act does not 
imply creation of a private right of action for its violation.”). 
 
8 The District Court reviewed the allegations under the 
general pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
8, but M&T argues that all § 14(a) claims are subject to the 
heightened pleading requirements of the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1). Still, the 
parties agree on the statements alleged to have been 
misleading, do not dispute their specificity, and thus do not 
argue that the pleading standard is determinative. 
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But during an “ancien regime,” courts followed a different 
path, often finding “as a routine matter . . . impl[ied] causes of 
action not explicit in the statutory text itself.” Ziglar v. Abbasi, 
137 S. Ct. 1843, 1855 (2017). And while courts have since 
“adopted a far more cautious course before finding implied 
causes of action,” id., in securities fraud actions under § 14(a) 
what was then is still now. Cathcart, 980 F.2d at 932 (citing 
Borak, 377 U.S. at 430–31); see also Halliburton Co. v. Erica 
P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 284 (2014) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (“[T]he implied 10b-5 private cause of action is ‘a 
relic of the heady days in which this Court assumed common-
law powers to create causes of action[.]’”) (quoting Corr. 
Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75 (2001) (Scalia, J., 
concurring)). So while courts have since “sworn off the habit 
of venturing beyond Congress’s intent,” the Shareholders’ suit, 
for now, still finds room in the half-empty “last drink” poured 
in Borak. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287 (2001); 
see also Wisniewski v. Rodale, Inc., 510 F.3d 294, 298 (3d Cir. 
2007) (noting Borak arrived during an “older and less 
restrictive approach to implied private rights of action”). 
Reconsideration of that interpretation is beyond our role, Bosse 
v. Oklahoma, 137 S. Ct. 1, 2 (2016), even if perhaps not beyond 
the horizon. See Emulex Corp. v. Varjabedian, 139 S. Ct. 1407 
(2019). 
 
 2. The Elements of an Omissions Claim 
 
 Section 14(a) makes it unlawful to solicit a proxy “in 
contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may 
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or 
for the protection of investors.” 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)(1). It 
“seeks to prevent management or others from obtaining 
authorization for corporate actions by means of deceptive or 
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inadequate disclosures in proxy solicitations.” Seinfeld v. 
Becherer, 461 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal quotations 
marks omitted). In turn, Rule 14a-9, promulgated by the SEC 
under the authority of Section 14(a), bars “false or misleading” 
material statements and omissions in a proxy.9 The 
Shareholders allege that M&T violated Rule 14a-9, and thus 
Section 14(a), by issuing a Joint Proxy lacking material 
information.  
 
 We have outlined a three-step test for liability under 
Section 14(a), requiring a showing that: “(1) a proxy statement 
contained a material misrepresentation or omission which (2) 
caused the plaintiff injury and (3) that the proxy solicitation 
itself, rather than the particular defect in the solicitation 
materials, was an essential link in the accomplishment of the 
transaction.” Tracinda Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler AG, 502 F.3d 
212, 228 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
And omissions in a proxy statement can violate Section 14(a) 
and Rule 14a-9 in one of two ways: where “[(a)] the SEC 
regulations specifically require disclosure of the omitted 
information in a proxy statement, or [(b)] the omission makes 
other statements in the proxy statement materially false or 
misleading.” Seinfeld, 461 F.3d at 369 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
 
9 “No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be 
made by means of any proxy statement . . . containing any 
statement which, at the time and in the light of the 
circumstances under which it is made, is false or misleading 
with respect to any material fact, or which omits to state any 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements therein 
not false or misleading[.]” 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9(a). 
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 But not every omission or misrepresentation will 
support a claim for damages. Tracinda Corp., 502 F.3d at 228. 
Rather, stated or omitted information must be “material,” and 
we have set forth a two-part definition. Id. First, we determine 
whether “there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable 
shareholder would consider [the omission or 
misrepresentation] important in deciding how to vote.” Id. 
(quoting Shaev v. Saper, 320 F.3d 373, 379 (3d Cir. 2003)). 
That involves an assessment of whether “the disclosure of the 
omitted fact or misrepresentation would have been viewed by 
the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the total 
mix of information made available.” EP Medsystems, Inc., v. 
EchoCath, Inc., 235 F.3d 865, 872 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal 
quotation marks and brackets omitted). 
 
 Second, we assess the materiality of a statement “at the 
time and in the light of the circumstances under which it is 
made.” Seinfeld, 461 F.3d at 369 (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-
9(a)). So “liability cannot be imposed on the basis of 
subsequent events,” In re NAHC, 306 F.3d at 1330, and the 
Monday morning quarterback remains on the bench.  
 
 3. The Second Amended Complaint Plausibly 
 Alleges Actionable Omissions 
 
 With the rules set, we turn to the words in the complaint 
and in the governing regulations. 
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  i. SEC Regulations and Interpretive  
   Guidance 
 
 The Shareholders allege M&T violated Section 14(a) 
because the Joint Proxy omitted material “risk factors” as 
required by Item 105, such as the condition of M&T’s 
regulatory compliance program, and its failure to disclose such 
risks made other statements misleading. As with statutory 
interpretation, our review of a regulation centers on the 
ordinary meaning of the text “and the court must give it effect, 
as the court would any law.” Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 
2415 (2019). That analysis uses all the “‘traditional tools’ of 
construction.” Id. (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. 
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984)). The text of 
Item 105 directs issuers to:  
 
[w]here appropriate, provide under the caption 
“Risk Factors” a discussion of the most 
significant factors that make an investment in the 
registrant or offering speculative or risky. This 
discussion must be concise and organized 
logically. Do not present risks that could apply 
generically to any registrant or any offering. 
Explain how the risk affects the registrant or the 
securities being offered. Set forth each risk factor 
under a subcaption that adequately describes the 
risk. . . . The registrant must furnish this 
information in plain English. 
 
17 C.F.R. § 229.105. While “regulations can sometimes make 
the eyes glaze over,” Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415, readers easily 
understand Item 105 to require issuers to disclose the most 
significant factors known to make an investment speculative or 
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risky. And those factors should be (a) concise and organized; 
(b) specific, not generic; and (c) include an explanation 
connecting the risks to the offer.10 17 C.F.R. § 229.105. 
 
 Language in guidance details these requirements. See 
Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415 (discussing the traditional “legal 
toolkit” of “text, structure, history, and purpose of a 
regulation”); see also Krieger v. Bank of Am., N.A., 890 F.3d 
429, 438–39 (3d Cir. 2018) (discussing agency guidance to 
inform ordinary meaning). A 1999 legal bulletin is particularly 
helpful. See SEC Division of Corporation Finance: Updated 
Staff Legal Bulletin No. 7, “Plain English Disclosure,” Release 
No. SLB-7, 1999 WL 34984247 (June 7, 1999). Under the 
section titled “Risk Factor Guidance,” the SEC explains that 
“issuers should not present risks that could apply to any issuer 
or any offering.” Id. at *1. The SEC also explains that Item 105 
risk factors fall loosely into three broad categories: 
 
Industry Risk — risks companies face by virtue 
of the industry they’re in. For example, many 
[real estate investment trusts] run the risk that, 
 
10 The parties do not argue that Section 229.105 creates 
an independent cause of action. Cf. Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 
275, 287–88 (3d Cir. 2000) (concluding that Item 303 does not 
create an independent cause of action for private plaintiffs). 
And we note that neither the language of Section 229.105, nor 
the SEC’s interpretative guidance suggests that it does. Id. at 
287. So our inquiry turns on whether the duty of disclosure 
mandated by Item 105, if violated, constitutes a material 
omission or misrepresentation under the standards of Section 
14(a) and its regulations. 
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despite due diligence, they will acquire 
properties with significant environmental issues. 
 
Company Risk — risks that are specific to the 
company. For example, a [real estate investment 
trust] owns four properties with significant 
environmental issues and cleaning up these 
properties will be a serious financial drain. 
 
Investment Risk — risks that are specifically 
tied to a security. For example, in a debt offering, 
the debt being offered is the most junior 
subordinated debt of the company.  
 
When drafting risk factors, be sure to specifically 
link each risk to your industry, company, or 
investment, as applicable. 
 
Id. at *5–6. 
 
 The bulletin includes a few illustrations contrasting a 
generic discussion with a satisfactory disclosure. Id. at *1, *6–
7. Here’s one example: 
 
Before:  
 
Competition 
 
The lawn care industry is highly competitive. 
The Company competes for commercial and 
retail customers with national lawn care service 
providers, lawn care product manufacturers with 
service components, and other local and regional 
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producers and operators. Many of these 
competitors have substantially greater financial 
and other resources than the Company. 
 
After: 
 
Because we are significantly smaller than the 
majority of our national competitors, we may 
lack the financial resources needed to capture 
increased market share. 
 
Based on total assets and annual revenues, we are 
significantly smaller than the majority of our 
national competitors: we are one-third the size of 
our next largest national competitor. If we 
compete with them for the same geographical 
markets, their financial strength could prevent us 
from capturing those markets. 
 
For example, our largest competitor did the 
following when it aggressively expanded five 
years ago: 
 
• launched extensive print and television 
campaigns to advertise their entry into new 
markets; 
 
• discounted their services for extended periods 
of time to attract new customers; and 
 
• provided enhanced customer service during the 
initial phases of these new relationships. 
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Our national competitors likely have the 
financial resources to do the same, and we do not 
have the financial resources needed to compete 
on this level. 
 
Because our local competitors are better 
positioned to capitalize on the industry’s fastest 
growing markets, we may emerge from this 
period of growth with only a modest increase in 
market share, at best. 
 
Industry experts predict that the smaller, 
secondary markets throughout the mid-west will 
soon experience explosive growth. We have 
forecasted that about 17% of our future long-
term growth will come from these markets. 
However, because it is common practice for 
lawn care companies in smaller markets to 
acquire customers through personal 
relationships, our competitors in nearly half of 
these mid-west markets are better positioned to 
capitalize on this anticipated explosive growth. 
Unlike us, these local competitors live and work 
in the same communities as their and our 
potential customers. 
 
For the foreseeable future, the majority of our 
sales people who cover these markets will work 
out of our two mid-west regional offices because 
we lack the financial resources to open local 
offices at this time. As a result, we may 
substantially fail to realize our forecasted 17% 
long-term growth from these markets. 
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 Id. at *6. In short, while Item 105 seeks a “concise” 
discussion, free of generic and generally applicable risks, it 
requires more than a short and cursory overview and instead 
asks for a full discussion of the relevant factors.11 17 C.F.R. 
§ 229.105. That, as we will see, is where the Joint Proxy fell, 
in a word, short.  
 
  ii. Interpretative Guidance from Other  
   Courts 
 
 Two cases considering the scope of adequate 
disclosures under Item 105 are also instructive. In Silverstrand 
Investments v. AMAG Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the First Circuit 
identified plausible allegations that a pharmaceutical 
company’s offering documents failed to adequately convey 
risks associated with a clinical drug. 707 F.3d 95, 108 (1st Cir. 
2013). In the offering, the company included details about the 
FDA approval process and the results of clinical trials. Id. at 
98–99. But the company did not disclose almost two dozen 
“Serious Adverse Events” it had reported to the FDA. Id. at 99. 
Instead, the offering noted only “ongoing FDA regulatory 
requirements” that carry the risk of “restrictions on our ability 
to market and sell” and other “sanctions.” Id. Reviewing both 
the language of the regulation and the SEC’s interpretive 
 
11 As the SEC explains, “[t]he goal of plain English is 
clarity, not brevity. Writing disclosure in plain English can 
sometimes increase the length of particular sections of your 
prospectus. You will likely reduce the length of your plain 
English prospectus by writing concisely and eliminating 
redundancies — not by eliminating substance.” See SEC Legal 
Bulletin No. 7, 1999 WL 34984247, at *5. 
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guidance, the First Circuit held that “a complaint alleging 
omissions of Item [105] risks needs to allege sufficient facts to 
infer that a registrant knew, as of the time of an offering, that . 
. . a risk factor existed.” Id. at 103. And given the many adverse 
reports the company submitted to the FDA, the court 
concluded the allegations “more than suffice” to plead a 
plausible claim of undisclosed risk. Id. at 104. 
 
 Compare those facts to City of Pontiac Policemen’s and 
Firemen’s Retirement System v. UBS AG, 752 F.3d 173, 183–
84 (2d Cir. 2014), alleging that UBS engaged in a tax evasion 
scheme. Following the indictment of UBS employees, the 
company disclosed “multiple legal proceedings and 
government investigations” showing exposure “to substantial 
monetary damages and legal defense costs,” along with 
“criminal and civil penalties, and the potential for regulatory 
restrictions.” Id. at 184 (internal brackets omitted). Not 
enough, argued plaintiffs, claiming UBS was also required to 
disclose that the fraudulent activity was, in fact, still ongoing. 
Id. The Second Circuit sharply disagreed because “disclosure 
is not a rite of confession, and companies do not have a duty to 
disclose uncharged, unadjudicated wrongdoing.” Id. (internal 
quotation marks and footnote omitted). To the contrary, by 
disclosing the litany of possible problems that could flow from 
these investigations, UBS complied with the directive of Item 
105. Id. 
 
 Both decisions rest soundly on the text of Item 105. 
First, a cause of action for failing to disclose a material risk 
naturally requires an allegation that a known risk factor existed 
at the time of the offering. Silverstrand, 707 F.3d at 103. 
Second, in keeping with Item 105’s call for a concise, not all-
inclusive disclosure, registrants need not list speculative facts 
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or unproven allegations, even if they fit within one of the 
identified factors. City of Pontiac, 752 F.3d at 184. And the 
two standards reflect the outcomes. The registrant in 
Silverstrand allegedly knew that the FDA would scrutinize the 
reported effects of its product, a gaze that carried specific risks 
to their business. So allegations of failing to disclose that factor 
was enough to state a claim. Compare that to the filer in City 
of Pontiac who packed the proxy with a host of risks focused 
on the company, its practices, the problems, and the possible 
penalties. Asking for more, as the Second Circuit noted, would 
create a new obligation grounded in guesswork.  
 
  iii. M&T’s Disclosure in the Joint Proxy  
   Lacks Description and Context of Its  
   Compliance Risks  
 
With these parameters, the shortcomings in M&T’s 
proxy become clear. M&T omitted company-specific detail 
about its compliance program. Yet M&T knew that the state of 
its compliance program would be subject to extensive review 
from federal regulators. And it understood that failure to pass 
regulatory scrutiny could sink the merger. Taken together, 
M&T had a duty to disclose more than generic information 
about the regulatory scrutiny that lay ahead. Instead, and 
contrary to the ordinary language of Item 105, it offered 
breadth where depth is required. 
 
 Start with the allegations about the BSA/AML 
compliance program. The Joint Proxy stated that “[c]ompletion 
of the merger . . . [is] subject to the receipt of all [regulatory] 
approvals,” a process that includes review of “the effectiveness 
of the companies in combatting money laundering.” (App. at 
A1017–18.) It noted that “we cannot be certain when or if we 
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will obtain [the regulatory approvals] or, if obtained, whether 
they will contain terms, conditions, or restrictions not currently 
contemplated.” (App. at A1017). And, “[l]ike all businesses, 
M&T is subject to operational risk, which represents the risk 
of loss resulting from human error, inadequate or failed 
internal processes and systems, and external events.” (App. at 
A0245.) Such “[o]perational risk,” the Joint Proxy noted, “also 
encompasses reputational risk and compliance and legal risk, 
which is the risk of loss from violations of, or noncompliance 
with, laws, rules, regulations, prescribed practices or ethical 
standards, as well as the risk of noncompliance with 
contractual and other obligations.” (App. at A0245.) And 
“[a]lthough M&T seeks to mitigate operational risk through a 
system of internal controls . . . , no system of controls . . . is 
infallible.” (App. at A0246). Any “[c]ontrol weaknesses or 
failures or other operational risks could result in charges, 
increased operational costs, harm to M&T’s reputation or 
foregone business opportunities.” (App. at A0246.) 
 
So M&T identified that the merger hinged on obtaining 
regulatory approval. And it singled out that determining the 
effectiveness of its BSA/AML program would be crucial to 
obtaining that approval. In fact, in “every case under the Bank 
Merger Act” the “[Federal Reserve] Board must take into 
consideration . . . records of compliance with anti-money-
laundering laws.”12 (App. at 1083 (emphasis added).) As M&T 
 
12 Other sources similarly support this conclusion. In its 
2010 BSA/AML Examination Manual, the Federal Financial 
Institutions Examination Council (“FFIEC”) called Title III of 
the USA PATRIOT Act “arguably the single most significant 
AML law that Congress enacted since the BSA itself.” FFIEC, 
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even noted, the Board is responsible for evaluating BSA/AML 
compliance under the authority of two separate statutes: 
Section 4 of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 and 
Section 18(c) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. (App. at 
A1018.) And so we have no difficulty concluding that the 
regulatory review process posed a significant risk to the merger 
that would make it speculative or risky. Put another way, M&T 
mentioned that regulatory hoops stood between the proposed 
merger and a final deal. 
 
 But M&T failed to discuss just how treacherous 
jumping through those hoops would be. Instead, M&T offered 
 
Bank Secrecy Act/ Anti-Money Laundering Examination 
Manual 8 (2010), https://www.occ.treas.gov/static/ots/exam-
handbook/ots-exam-handbook-1400.pdf.  
 
In both the 2010 Manual and the updated 2014 Manual, 
the FFIEC warned that bank management “must be vigilant” 
in BSA/AML compliance and stated: “Banks should take 
reasonable and prudent steps to combat money laundering and 
terrorist financing and to minimize their vulnerability to the 
risk associated with such activities. Some banking 
organizations have damaged their reputations and have been 
required to pay civil money penalties for failing to implement 
adequate controls within their organization resulting in 
noncompliance with the BSA.” See FFIEC, Bank Secrecy Act/ 
Anti-Money Laundering Examination Manual 10 (2010), 
https://www.occ.treas.gov/static/ots/exam-handbook/ots-
exam-handbook-1400.pdf, and FFIEC, Bank Secrecy Act/ 
Anti-Money Laundering Examination Manual 6 (2015) (V2), 
https://bsaaml.ffiec.gov/manual. 
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information generally applicable to nearly any entity operating 
in a regulated environment. In fact, M&T said that: “[l]ike all 
businesses,” it was subject to regulatory risk. (App. at A0245.) 
Contrary to Item 105’s directive, M&T’s explanation of the 
regulatory review process offered no details and no more than 
“[g]eneric or boilerplate discussions [that] do not [explain] . . . 
the risks.” Silverstrand, 707 F.3d at 103. 
 
 Indeed, M&T’s generic statement about money 
laundering compliance is not far from the risk statement 
offered in SEC guidance as inadequate. As recommended by 
the SEC’s guidance, M&T should have “specifically link[ed]” 
its general statements to “each risk to [its] industry, company, 
or investment” using details that connected the pending merger 
review to its existing and anticipated business lines.13 SEC 
Legal Bulletin No. 7, 1999 WL 34984247, at *6. But such 
concise and plain discussions of the significance of regulatory 
review, framed in the context of M&T’s particular business 
and industry, are absent from the Joint Proxy. As a result, the 
Shareholders have plausibly alleged that had M&T disclosed 
the state of its BSA/AML program in the context of regulatory 
scrutiny that program would face, “there is a substantial 
likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would [have] 
consider[ed] it important in deciding how to vote.”14 Seinfeld, 
 
13 The only specificity on the subject appears in M&T’s 
incorporated 2011 Annual Report stating, in sharp contrast, 
that it had in place “approved policies and procedures believed 
to comply with the USA Patriot Act.” (App. at A1028.) 
 
14 M&T insists that even if the Proxy Statement 
warnings could insufficiently state the BSA/AML deficiencies, 
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461 F.3d at 369. 
 
 M&T’s discussions about the problems surrounding its 
consumer checking practice are likewise deficient. Here, the 
Shareholders claim that M&T was, in fact, aware of the 
malpractice. The Second Amended Complaint alleges that 
M&T’s faulty practice—first offering free checking, then 
switching customers to accounts carrying fees—pre-dated the 
merger agreement. The Joint Proxy did not mention the non-
compliant practice or the company’s steps to remediate the 
action. And unlike the BSA/AML deficiencies, M&T did not 
later attempt to cure its omission—even as it became aware that 
the merger faced indefinite delays upon learning of the 
regulatory investigation into the BSA/AML deficiencies. The 
Shareholders ask that we infer that the consumer checking 
practices cast doubt on M&T’s controls and compliance 
systems, and posed an independent regulatory risk to the 
merger material enough that a reasonable shareholder would 
consider it important in deciding how to vote. On these facts, 
that inference is reasonable. 
  
 
at least the “supplemental disclosures” ensured that “no 
reasonable shareholder would have been misled about the 
regulatory hurdles the merger faced.” (Response Br. at 35.) But 
the supplemental disclosures plausibly failed to cure the defect 
that had already occurred given the omitted risks—both on the 
lateness of its release and the sufficiency of the information 
conveyed. Least to say, the effect of the supplemental 
disclosures raises an issue of fact, which precludes dismissal 
for now. 
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  iv. Concision is Not Clairvoyance 
 
M&T contends that this appeal “presents the question 
whether filers of stock-based merger proxies are obligated, . . . 
to predict regulatory action before it occurs.” (Appellees’ 
Supp. Br. at 1.) Indeed, Item 105 does not. Another regulation, 
Item 103, does require disclosure of potential or present 
litigation or regulatory enforcement. 17 CFR § 229.103. So the 
“risk factors” requiring disclosure under Item 105 are separate 
from legal risks under Item 103. But M&T’s contention 
assumes that only risks that are, or later blossom into, 
regulatory enforcement actions require disclosure. Item 105 is 
not so narrowly drawn, and we cannot read a line into the law 
where one does not exist. See Rotkiske v. Klemm, 140 S. Ct. 
355, 360–61 (2019) (“It is a fundamental principle of statutory 
interpretation that ‘absent provision[s] cannot be supplied by 
the courts.’”) (quoting Scalia & Garner, supra, at 94). 
 
To be clear, we do not hold that the regulatory 
enforcement actions by themselves required M&T to disclose 
these issues.15 Later litigation or regulatory enforcement does 
 
15 Our decision in General Electric Co. v. Cathcart does 
not aid M&T. In Cathcart, we held that “speculative disclosure 
[of potential legal claims] is not required under Section 14(a).” 
980 F.2d at 935. But Cathcart arose from the alleged failure to 
disclose hypothetical future legal claims, particularly claims 
against individual directors and officers—not against the 
company itself. Id. at 935–36. We concluded that the 
defendants had no duty to disclose potential liability without 
pending or threatened litigation. Id. at 931. In doing so, we 
found that a reasonable shareholder would not find the 
 
 
 
31 
 
 
not create a retroactive duty to disclose. But like the defendants 
in Silverstrand, M&T knew the regulators would be looking 
into its compliance program, and specifically its BSA/AML 
effectiveness. They said so themselves. And they knew the 
failure to obtain regulatory approval would be significant, 
possibly fatal, to the merger. Yet, unlike the defendants in City 
of Pontiac, M&T offered little more than generic statements 
about the process of regulatory review. The Shareholders also 
allege that M&T knew that its consumer checking program 
skirted regulatory standards, as they claim M&T curtailed its 
misconduct shortly after signing the merger agreement. Like 
BSA/AML compliance, we can infer this practice posed a 
separate and significant regulatory risk to the merger, as 
personal checking is a principal business component of any 
 
possibility of future claims against directors and officers to be 
material—as opposed to litigation against the company—
unless it ripened into pending or threatened litigation. Id. at 
936–37 (concluding that otherwise requiring General Electric 
to disclose potential litigation against all of its 280,000 
employees would “bury the shareholders in [an] avalanche of 
trivial information”). And Cathcart distinguished its 
determination of materiality in the context of liability of 
directors and officers from materiality in the context of 
mergers, “in which the shareholders would understandably 
focus on the operation of the company as a whole.” Id. at 937. 
Here, it was not the future threat of regulatory action that 
triggered the need for disclosure under Item 105. Rather, it was 
the failure to disclose the risks associated with the compliance 
program. It is thus plausible to conclude that a reasonable 
shareholder would consider the failure of M&T’s internal 
compliance program on these issues to be a material element 
about the company’s operations. 
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consumer bank. And so regulatory review of a bank’s 
consumer checking practices as part of a merger would not be 
unexpected. But whether M&T had actual knowledge of the 
shortcomings in its BSA/AML compliance or its consumer 
checking practices is of no moment; it is the risk to the merger 
posed by the regulatory inspection itself that triggered the need 
for disclosures under Item 105. And the Shareholders have 
stated allegations that support a reasonable inference that the 
omission of information related to these risks was material, as 
evidenced by the threat to the merger caused by the 
pervasiveness of these deficiencies. This theory may not 
survive discovery, but it is enough for plaintiffs to meet their 
pleading burden. 
 
 As a result, the Second Amended Complaint plausibly 
alleges that the BSA/AML deficiencies and consumer 
checking practices posed significant risks to the merger before 
M&T issued the Joint Proxy. And based on these allegations, 
it’s also plausible that disclosing the weaknesses present in 
M&T’s BSA/AML and consumer compliance programs 
“would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having 
significantly altered the total mix of information made 
available.” EP Medsystems, Inc., 235 F.3d at 872 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Thus, the Shareholders have met 
their pleading burden. 
 
B. The Shareholders Allege No Misleading Opinions 
 
We agree with the District Court that the Shareholders 
failed to allege an actionably misleading opinion statement. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Omnicare provides the 
relevant framework, holding that an opinion statement is 
misleading if it “omits material facts” about the “inquiry into 
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or knowledge concerning a statement of opinion.” 575 U.S. at 
189. But liability attaches only “if those facts conflict with 
what a reasonable investor would take from the statement 
itself.” Id. Alleging an actionable claim under this theory “is 
no small task,” id. at 194, because a reasonable investor 
“understand[s] that opinions sometimes rest on a weighing of 
competing facts; indeed, the presence of such facts is one 
reason why an issuer may frame a statement as an opinion.”16 
Id. at 189–90. 
 
The Shareholders’ allegations do not meet this rigorous 
benchmark. First, they point to M&T’s opinion on when it 
believed the merger might close and the state of its BSA/AML 
compliance program in its 2011 Annual Report.17 The 
 
16 We have not considered whether Omnicare applies to 
claims brought under the Exchange Act and under 
Section 14(a). But it is unnecessary to resolve that question 
here. Even assuming Omnicare’s holding applies, the 
Shareholders have failed to allege an actionably misleading 
opinion. 
 
17 The Joint Proxy states that “[a]lthough we currently 
believe we should be able to obtain all required regulatory 
approvals in a timely manner, we cannot be certain when or if 
we will obtain them or, if obtained, whether they will contain 
terms, conditions or restrictions not currently contemplated 
that will be detrimental to or have a material adverse effect on 
M&T or its subsidiaries after the completion of the merger.” 
(App. at A1009 (emphasis added); see also App. at A1017).) It 
adds “[t]he Registrant and its impacted subsidiaries have 
approved policies and procedures that are believed to be 
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Shareholders argue both are misleading because the opinions 
turned out to be wrong. But Omnicare rejected that premise, 
holding “a[] [plaintiff] cannot state a claim by alleging only 
that an opinion was wrong . . . .” 575 U.S. at 194. As there is 
no allegation that M&T offered an insincere opinion, it “is not 
an untrue statement of material fact, regardless [of] whether an 
investor can ultimately prove the belief wrong.” Id. at 186 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
Second, the Shareholders allege the Joint Proxy omitted 
facts about the process M&T followed to form its opinions. 
They allege, again in conclusory fashion, that M&T and 
Hudson acted negligently in reviewing M&T’s compliance 
program. The Second Amended Complaint alleges that while 
“M&T conducted intensive due diligence” of Hudson “from 
June 2012 through August 27, 2012,” by contrast, Hudson did 
not begin its “reverse due diligence” until August 20, 2012, 
which lasted “at most five business days.” (App. at A0935.) 
These efforts, the Shareholders allege, were not enough, and 
show that the opinion statements were insufficient. But the 
Shareholders omit particular facts about the banks’ conduct. 
 
To begin, the Joint Proxy disclosed the duration of the 
due diligence efforts. “[T]o avoid exposure for omissions,” a 
speaker “need only divulge an opinion’s basis, or else make 
clear the real tentativeness of its belief.” Omnicare, 575 U.S. 
at 195. Thus, even if a reasonable investor would have 
expected the banks to conduct diligence over a longer period, 
the Joint Proxy provided enough information to understand 
what the banks did, information enough to decide how to vote. 
 
compliant with the USA Patriot Act.” (App. at A1028 
(emphasis added).) 
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And, in any event, general allegations of negligence do not 
suffice. See id. at 195–96. In all, the opinions flowed from the 
Joint Proxy’s description of the increased scrutiny across the 
industry. Cautionary language surrounds the opinions, warning 
of the uncertainty of projections about regulatory approval. 
Under Omnicare, these opinions inform, rather than mislead, a 
reasonable investor. And so we will affirm the District Court’s 
dismissal of the Shareholders’ misleading opinion claims. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
We conclude with caveats, cautions, and qualms. First, 
that the Shareholders have adequately pleaded facts that, if 
true, might warrant remedy naturally says nothing at this stage 
of the litigation about their ultimate truth. Second, that M&T 
might have pursued different choices managing its business is 
not the focus of our decision. Rather, it is that M&T had an 
obligation to speak concisely about the risks surrounding their 
plans. 
 
Finally, our application of now well-established 
principles of securities fraud class actions does not alleviate 
our worry over the many well-argued doubts about these kinds 
of aggregate claims. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming 
the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its 
Implementation, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1534, 1536 (2006) 
(explaining “class actions produce wealth transfers among 
shareholders that neither compensate nor deter”). Despite 
reams of academic study, steady questions from the courts, and 
periodic Congressional attention, the number of securities class 
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actions continues to rise each year.18 Whether that tide 
represents an efficient current or “muddled logic and armchair 
economics,” Halliburton, 573 U.S. at 297 (Thomas, J., 
concurring), is the sort of question that deserves a more 
searching inquiry. In the meantime, we will affirm the District 
Court’s dismissal of the Shareholders’ claims that M&T made 
misleading opinion statements, and vacate the dismissal of the 
claims about M&T’s risk disclosure obligations. 
 
18 “Since 2012, securities-fraud suits have steadily 
increased each year; most recently, there was a 7.5% year-
over-year increase in 2016 and an additional 15.1% jump in 
2017.” Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Rise of 
Securities-Fraud Class Actions, 132 Harv. L. Rev. 1067, 1070 
(2019) (citing Cornerstone Research, Securities Class Action 
Filings: 2017 Year in Review 39 (2018)). 
